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Abstract
The present study investigates whether ethnic diversity among firms’ directors influ-
ences the decision to take goodwill write-offs, after considering the economic factors 
of impairment (measured in terms of the market capitalization indicator), reporting 
incentives, and firms’ internal governance. The analysis focuses on energy firms in 
Malaysia from 2006 to 2018. The regressions results based on binary logistics show that 
energy firms are less likely to take goodwill write-offs even when the market indicates 
the possibility for the write-offs. The results also show the absence of the direct relation-
ship between goodwill impairment decisions and ethnic diversity of the board of direc-
tors. Nevertheless, the results reveal that board ethnicity moderates the relationship 
between firms’ goodwill impairment decisions and the market capitalization indicator, 
suggesting that as firms encounter increasing market indicator of impairment losses, 
the board with diverse ethnicity positively influences firms in taking goodwill write-
offs. The results of the present study add to the literature on board diversity and firms’ 
decisions with regard to goodwill impairment by highlighting the beneficial roles of 
having ethnically diverse board of directors, in that they use the market indicator that 
goodwill may be impaired in their monitoring role on the goodwill impairment deci-
sions. The results offer input to the policymakers by suggesting that to strengthen the 
monitoring roles of the board of directors, they need to be diverse and equipped with 
indicators that would assist them in their monitoring decisions.
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INTRODUCTION
The recognition that board diversity is essential and beneficial has 
generated several initiatives, guidelines, and legislation by govern-
ment, business leaders, and other professionals (Kochan, Bezrukova, 
& Ely, 2003; Low, Roberts, & Whiting, 2015). For example, to assist 
companies in leveraging cultural diversity for competitive advantage, 
in the United States of America (US), a group of industry chief exec-
utives and human resource professionals have set up a non-profit or-
ganization that is known as Business Opportunities for Leadership 
Diversity (BOLD) Initiative (Kochan et al., 2003). Besides, to en-
courage female directors’ involvement in the board, governments of 
Norway, Spain, Italy, and Malaysia have passed legislation imposing 
a quota on female directors (Carter, D’Souza, Simkins, & Simpson, 
2010; Low et al., 2015).
Despite the increasing interest in diversity at organizations, past re-
searchers show a low level of diversity at workplace, both at an inter-
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national level and in Malaysia (DeGroot, Mohapatra, & Lippman, 2013; PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2013). 
For example, DeGroot et al. (2013) examine diversity at workplace of Standard & Poor’s 100 Index (S&P 
100) of US companies in 2012. They reported that 56% of these companies do not have minorities in 
their highest paid executives (DeGroot et al., 2013).
In Malaysia, even though the country comprises multiracial population, a survey of 122 Malaysian 
listed firms by PricewaterhouseCoopers in 2012 reported that less than 35% of the top management is 
Bumiputera (indigenous people). Moreover, 54% of the respondents are unwilling to disclose the ethnic 
composition of their workforce in the annual reports (PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2013). Abdullah, Ku 
Ismail, and Nachum (2015), in their analysis of gender diversity of 841 Malaysian listed firms in 2008, 
found that although Malaysia comprises diverse ethnic groups, the diversity is not mirrored in the 
boards of the sample firms they examined.
Given the increasing interest for diversity at workplace, both at the international level and inside 
Malaysia, the present study aims to investigate whether board ethnic diversity influences the Malaysian 
energy firms’ decision to take goodwill write-offs. To date, studies on goodwill impairment decisions 
revolved around the concerned on the untimely recognition of impairment charges of goodwill, which 
resulted in the temporary overstatement of goodwill (see a review of past studies in Abdul-Majid, 2019). 
Thus, the present study aims to analyze whether the diverse ethnic groups in the board of directors man-
age to address the untimely recognition of goodwill write-offs.
The analysis focuses on all energy firms with goodwill balances and/or goodwill impairment losses in 
Malaysia from 2006 to 2018 and by performing a binary logistic regression. This study selected energy 
firms because, in Malaysia, the energy sector plays a crucial role in the economic growth of the country 
(Hannan, Begum, Abdolrasol, Hossain Lipu, & Mohamed, 2018). For example, in the Ninth Malaysian 
Plan, the government allocated RM 1.8 billion for the energy sector (Mekhilef, Safari, Mustaffa, Saidur, 
& Omar, 2012).
1. LITERATURE REVIEW 
AND HYPOTHESES 
DEVELOPMENT 
The effect of ethnic diversity of the board of di-
rectors on goodwill impairment decisions is test-
ed using two approaches. First, the present study 
tests the direct relationship between board eth-
nic diversity (i.e., ETHNIC_BOD) and goodwill 
impairment decisions. Second, the present study 
tests whether the ethnically diverse board uses the 
market indicator that goodwill may be impaired 
in their monitoring of firms’ goodwill impairment 
decisions. This is accomplished by constructing 
an interaction term (i.e., ETHNIC_BOD⋅BTM) be-
tween board ethnic diversity and book-to-market 
ratio.
The present study also tests for the influence of the 
economic factors of impairment and firms’ report-
ing incentives on goodwill write-offs decisions.
1.1. Board ethnic diversity
Prior studies on board diversity tend to focus 
on gender diversity of the board of directors 
(Carter, Simkins, & Simpson, 2010). Studies 
on board ethnic diversity are limited and pro-
vide mixed results. As an illustration, Carter 
et al. (2003) report a positive relationship be-
tween board ethnic diversity and firms’ finan-
cial performance (Tobin’s Q), while Carter et 
al. (2010) and Garcia-Meca, Garcia-Sanchez, 
and Martinez-Ferrero (2015) found such rela-
tionship not to be statistically significant. To 
the researcher’s knowledge, no study has exam-
ined the inf luence of board ethnic diversity on 
goodwill impairment decisions. With the lack 
of prior studies, the following non-directional 
hypothesis is formulated:
H1: Board ethnic diversity (ETHNIC_BOD) is 
significantly associated with the likelihood 
for firms to take goodwill write-offs.
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To test whether the ethnically diverse boards use 
the market indicator that goodwill may be im-
paired in their monitoring decision concerning 
goodwill impairment losses, the present study 
construct an interaction term (i.e., ETHNIC_
BOD⋅BTM) between board ethnic diversity and 
book-to-market ratio. The present study expects 
that as firms encounter increasing market indica-
tor that their goodwill may be impaired (through 
high book-to-market ratio), the ethnically diverse 
board positively influences firms’ decisions to take 
goodwill write-offs. Thus, the following hypothe-
sis is formulated:
H2: The association between board ethnic diver-
sity and the likelihood for firms to take good-
will write-offs is stronger with the increment 
in the market capitalization indicators.
1.2. Economic factors of impairment: 
the market capitalization 
indicator
Market capitalization indicator refers to a condition 
when a market value of a firm falls below its book 
value (hereafter known as the market capitaliza-
tion indicator). This proxy is derived from an indi-
cation of impairment of assets, as stated in MFRS 
136 Impairment of Assets. The market capitalization 
indicator is examined in the present study as a po-
tential determinant of firms’ decisions to take good-
will write-offs. This is because if the firm’s market 
value falls below the book value, it suggests that in-
vestors perceive the firm to be overvalued (Ernst & 
Young, 2008). If this market capitalization indicator 
persists for several years, then it represents a poten-
tial factor that may lead to risk of impairment losses 
(PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2009).
Accordingly, the present study formulates the fol-
lowing hypothesis:
H3: The market capitalization indicator (meas-
ured as BTM) positively influences the like-
lihood for firms to take goodwill write-offs.
1.3. Reporting incentive:  
debt hypothesis
Prior studies analyzing the motives of firms for re-
porting impairment charges of goodwill postulate 
that firms are unwilling to take goodwill write-
offs or tend to avoid the write-offs when they are 
approaching debt covenant violations (Beatty & 
Weber, 2006; Ramanna & Watts, 2012). By taking 
goodwill write-offs, their current year earnings 
will be affected, which in turn impact the debt 
covenants that rely on the reported earnings.
In this paper, following the past studies (e.g., 
Ramanna & Watts, 2012; Abdul-Majid, 2015), lev-
erage (DEBTRATIO), which is total debts deflated 
by prior year total assets, is applied as a measure 
of firms’ that are most likely to violate their debt 
covenants violation. In line with debt hypothesis, 
the relationship between leverage and goodwill 
impairment decisions is formulated as follows:
H4: Leverage (DEBTRATIO) negatively influenc-






to H4, this study performs the binary lo-
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The present study controls for 1) internal cor-
porate governance (i.e., the ratio of independ-
ent directors on the board, BOD_INDP; size of 
the board of directors, BOD_SIZE; average age 
of the directors, BOD_AGE; gender of the direc-
tors, BOD_GENDER), 2) other economic factors 
inf luencing goodwill write-offs (i.e., change in 
cash f lows from operating activities, OCF; the 
magnitude of goodwill balance (GWB), 3) firms’ 
specifc factor (firm size, SIZE), and 4) the im-
pact of the global financial crisis (GFC). Table 1 
presents the variable definitions for the present 
study.
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2.2. Sample selection
This study selected all the energy firms with good-
will balance and/or goodwill impairment losses 
listed on the Bursa Malaysia from 2006 to 2018. 
Overall, 192 firm-year observations from 2006 to 
2018 fulfilled all the selection criteria.
3. RESULTS
3.1. Summary statistics
Table 2 shows the summary statistics for the anal-
ysis of whether board ethnic diversity influences 
firms’ financial performance. The results show 
that on average the sample firms reported a book-
to-market ratio of 1.083 (a median of 0.865), sug-
gesting there is a gap between the amount of equi-
ty reported by the sample firms and the value per-
ceived by the market. The table also shows that the 
sample firms have diverse ethnicity in the board 
(ETHNIC_BOD) with an average of 43.0% (and a 
median of 47.0%). In addition, the table shows the 
magnitude of goodwill balance (GWB) is skewed 
with a mean of 0.428 and a median of 0.094 (skew-
ness of 3.117, result unreported). The transforma-
tion of the variable using natural logarithm reduc-
es the skewness to 0.617 (results unreported).
Mann-Whitney U-test and t-test were performed 
to investigate whether the sample firms that rec-
Table 1. Variable definitions
GWIL




Board ethnic diversity, which is measured using Blau’s (1977) index based on four groups, i.e., Malay, Chinese, 
Indian, and foreigner.
BTM The ratio of the book value of equity to its market value reported at the year-end.
ETHNIC_BOD*BTM An interaction term between ETHNIC_BOD and BTM.
DEBTRATIO Measured as prior year total debts deflated by total assets. 
Corporate governance mechanism
BOD_INDP The ratio of non-executive directors who are independent in the board.
BOD_SIZE Total number of directors.
BOD_AGE Average age of directors in the board. 
BOD_GENDER The ratio of female directors in the board of directors.
Other impairment factors
∆OCF Change in operating cash flows from current year to the prior year deflated by total assets of the prior year.
GWB Goodwill balance at the beginning of the year deflated by prior year total assets.
Firms’ specific factor
SIZE Firm’s size, computed as natural logarithm of prior year total assets. 
Global financial crisis
GFC
Set to one when the financial year ended within the financial crises (i.e., 2008, 2009, or 2010), and zero 
otherwise.
Table 2. Summary statistics and univariate tests
Variable
All observations Test of differences (zero vs. write-off)
Mean Median SD Mean p-value Median p-value
ETHNIC_BOD 0.430 0.470 0.179 0.812 0.752
BTM 1.083 0.865 1.552 0.200 0.560
DEBTRATIO 0.306 0.313 0.194 0.158 0.179
BOD_INDP 0.485 0.500 0.129 0.617 0.432
BOD_SIZE 7.591 7.000 1.504 0.066 0.111
BOD_AGE 55.865 55.750 4.494 0.704 0.973
BOD_GENDER 0.095 0.100 0.108 0.688 0.487
∆OCF 0.005 0.007 0.107 0.237 0.153
GWB 0.428 0.094 0.660 0.100 0.072
SIZE 13.859 13.841 1.196 0.641 0.742
Note: Refer to Table 1 for variable definitions.
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ognized goodwill write-offs differ from those 
firms that recognized zero write-offs. The results 
reveal that firms that reported goodwill impair-
ment losses have significantly larger number of 
directors (BOD_SIZE) and higher proportion of 
goodwill relative to the total assets (GWB), both at 
a p-value less than 10%.
The present study assesses the issue of multicollin-
earity by performing the Pearson correlation co-
efficients (see Table 3) and the variance inflation 
factor (VIF). Table 3 reports that the highest cor-
relation between independent variables was be-
tween firms’ size (SIZE) and gender of the board 
of directors (BOD_GENDER) at 0.43 (p-value less 
than 1%). Additionally, none of the VIFs exceed 
10, as the highest VIF is for SIZE at 1.749 (results 
unreported). These results suggest the lack of mul-
ticollinearity issue in this study. 
3.2. Binary logistic regression analysis
Table 4 shows the regression results for the inves-
tigation of the influence of board ethnic diversity 
on goodwill impairment decisions by energy firms 
in Malaysia from 2006 to 2018, after controlling 
for economic factors of impairment, reporting in-
centives, and internal corporate governance. The 
present study tests whether board ethnic diversity 
(ETHNIC_BOD) influence the firms’ performance 
using two approaches. In H1, the present study 
tests the direct relationship between ethnic di-
versity of the board of directors (ETHNIC_BOD) 
and goodwill impairment decisions. The findings 
reveal no significant relationship between board 
ethnic diversity and firms’ decisions to take good-
will write-offs. 
In H2, this study tests whether the ethnically di-
verse board moderates the relationship between the 
market capitalization indicator (BTM) and the like-
lihood for firms to take goodwill write-offs. This is 
done by constructing an interaction term between 
board ethnic diversity and the market capitalization 
indicator (ETHNIC_BOD⋅BTM). Similar to the ex-
pectation formulated earlier, ETHNIC_BOD⋅BTM 
reports positive coefficients, which is statistically 
significant (p < 5%), thus supporting H2. The re-
sults show that board ethnic diversity moderates 
the relationship between the market capitalization 
indicator and goodwill impairment decisions.
3.3. Binary logistic regression analysis
In H3, the present study expects the market capi-
talization indicator (BTM) to positively influence 
the likelihood for firms to take goodwill write-offs. 
Contrary to the expectation set, BTM reports nega-
tive coefficient (at a p < 10%), thus rejecting H3. The 
results suggest that with the increasing market in-
dicator of goodwill impairment (BTM), the tenden-
cy for firms to take goodwill write-offs declines. 
In H4, the present study posits a negative relation-
ship between DEBTRATIO and the likelihood for 
firms to take goodwill write-offs. The results in 
Table 4 reports the coefficient on DEBTRATIO as 
positive and not statistically significant. Thus, the 
empirical findings of the present could not sup-
port the debt hypothesis. 
Table 3. Pearson correlation coefficients 
Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
GWIL 1.00
BTM –0.09 1.00
ETHNIC_BOD 0.02 0.09 1.00
DEBTRATIO 0.10 –0.15* –0.10 1.00
BOD_INDP 0.04 0.04 0.03 –0.04 1.00
BOD_SIZE –0.13 0.05 0.03 0.13 –0.01 1.00
BOD_AGE –0.02 0.09 –0.03 –0.06 –0.17* 0.05 1.00
BOD_GENDER –0.03 0.03 0.00 –0.01 –0.05 0.28** 0.27** 1.00
∆OCF 0.08 –0.05 –0.07 0.06 –0.04 0.02 –0.04 0.04 1.00
GWB 0.12 0.20** 0.18* 0.14 0.05 0.05 –0.21** –0.03 –0.03 1.00
SIZE 0.03 0.14 0.01 0.23** –0.01 0.41** 0.39** 0.43** –0.03 0.07 1.00
GFC 0.04 –0.03 –0.06 –0.03 –0.02 –0.12 –0.14* –0.11 0.02 0.07 –0.16* 1.00
Note: *, ** significance at a p-value of less than 5% level (2-tailedd) and 1% level (2-tailed), respectively. Refer to Table 1 for 
variable definitions.
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Regarding control variables, the results show a 
statistically significant relationship between GWB 
and the likelihood for firms to take goodwill im-
pairment losses, suggesting that firms with large 
magnitude of goodwill balance are more likely to 
take goodwill impairment losses. The table also 
shows that the relationship between firms’ deci-
sions to take goodwill write-offs and the remain-
ing control variables is not statistically significant.
4. DISCUSSION
Malaysia is a country with multiracial population. 
One tool in promoting the inclusive society in the 
country is by valuing diverse workforce. Thus, dur-
ing the Business Leaders Dialogue in 2015, the Prime 
Minister emphasized that the ethnic diversity being 
present in Malaysia should be reflected in organiza-
tions (TalentCorp, 2015). In line with this aspiration, 
this paper examines the influence of ethnic diversi-
ty of the board of directors on goodwill impairment 
decisions by energy firms in Malaysia from 2006 to 
2018, after controlling for the market capitalization 
indicator, firms’ reporting incentives, and other gov-
ernance mechanisms. Thus far, past studies on good-
will impairment decisions (e.g., see Abdul-Majid, 
2019) highlight the concern on the late recognition of 
goodwill write-offs that lead to inflated goodwill bal-
ance temporarily. Hence, the present study aims to 
investigate whether the diverse ethnic groups among 
the directors manage to address the untimely recog-
nition of goodwill write-offs.
Based on total 192 observations from 2006 to 2018, 
the regression results show that energy firms are less 
likely to take goodwill impairment losses even when 
the market perceived their goodwill to be impaired, 
suggesting the untimely recognition of goodwill 
write-offs. These results are similar to those reported 
by past studies (e.g., see a review of past studies in 
Abdul-Majid, 2019) that goodwill impairment charg-
es reported by firms lagged their share performance. 
With regard to the direct relationship between eth-
nic diversity in the board and goodwill impairment 
decisions, the regression results could not find any 
significant relationship between the two variables, 
suggesting that board ethnic diversity has no direct 
effect on firms’ decision to take goodwill impair-
ment losses. To date, no studies have investigated the 
influence of board ethnic diversity on firms’ good-
will impairment decisions. Hence, the present study 
cannot compare the results with past studies.
In addition to testing the direct relationship, the 
present study also tests the indirect relationship 
between board ethnic diversity and goodwill im-
pairment decisions, using an interaction term (i.e., 
ETHNIC_BOD⋅BTM) between board ethnic diversi-



















–2 Log likelihood – 135.082
Cox & Snell R square – 12.0%
Nagelkerke R square – 21.2%
Note: *, **, *** significance at a p-value < 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively (at 2-tailed tests). Refer to Table 1 for variable 
definitions.
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ty and the market capitalization indicator (measured 
using book-to-market ratio, BTM). The binary logis-
tic regression results reveal that board ethnic diver-
sity moderates the relationship between the market 
capitalization indicator and goodwill impairment 
decisions, suggesting that as firms encounter in-
creasing market indicator that their goodwill may be 
impaired (through high book-to-market ratios), the 
ethnically diverse board of directors positively in-
fluence firms to take goodwill write-offs. The results 
indicate the business case for board ethnic diversi-
ty in addressing untimely recognition of goodwill 
write-offs. Similar to Richard et al. (2007), the empir-
ical findings of this study support the positive influ-
ence of having ethnically diverse board. In the case 
of Richard et al. (2007), racial diversity among the 
directors improve firms’ performance, while in the 
present study, the ethnically diverse board improve 
firms’ goodwill impairment decisions.
As for the control variables, similar to Lapointe-
Antunes et al. (2008), the results show that the likeli-
hood of the sample firms to take goodwill write-offs 
increases with the magnitude of goodwill balance.
CONCLUSION
In conclusion, the present study has investigated whether board ethnic diversity influences firms’ decisions 
in taking goodwill write-offs, focusing on energy firms in Malaysia over a thirteen-year period from 2006 to 
2018. The results showed no direct relationship between board ethnic diversity and goodwill impairment de-
cisions. Instead, the results exhibited a moderating effect of the board ethnic diversity on firms’ decisions to 
take their goodwill write-offs. Specifically, the ethnically diverse board positively influences firms in taking 
goodwill write-offs when there are market indicators for the possibility of the write-offs.
The empirical evidence documented in the present study adds to the literature on board diversity and 
firms’ decisions to take goodwill write-offs by highlighting the beneficial roles of having diverse ethnic-
ity in the board in resolving the untimely recognition of goodwill write-offs. Specifically, the board with 
diverse ethnicity uses the market indicator that goodwill may be impaired in their monitoring role on 
firms’ goodwill impairment decisions. Hence, the diverse ethnic groups among the directors manage to 
address the untimely recognition of goodwill write-offs.
This study offers input to the policymakers, in that to improve the monitoring roles of the board of 
directors, they need to be ethnically diverse and equip with tools or indicators to assist them in their 
monitoring roles. The present study can be extended to other countries with multiracial population, 
such as North Africa and Central Asia. Hopefully, it will improve the understanding on the influence of 
ethnically diverse board on firms’ decisions and performance.
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